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Abstract 
In this paper we propose a leader – follower dynamic model of taxation with the 
government imposing a tax to internalize externalities caused by polluting firms. As 
expected the Stackelberg games with the government acting as leader yield time 
inconsistent outcomes. We first show how time inconsistency can be avoided 
adopting specific utility functions. We then propose a pollution model that uses 
abatement as the value of accumulated pollution stock and find that the outcome of 
the proposed Stackelberg model is time consistent with an open – loop informational 
structure. This yields a tax factor that is time independent. Finally, we show that the 
result of the game is inefficient compared to the social planner dynamic game.  
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1.  Introduction 
The Stackelberg model is one of the most interesting in Economics. It is 
common that in most economic branches of activities one or more powerful firms 
dictate the others react to its (announcing) decisions. In this paper, we propose an a la 
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Stackelberg dynamic model of taxation, where government imposes at the start of the 
game a tax rule ( )tτ  in order to correct the externalities incurred by polluting firms. 
Existing models in the literature (e.g. Long – Benchekroun, 1998) faces the 
same type problems in a sense of dynamic models where the tax rule announced by 
the government is an exogenized functional and the tax bill, at time t , is a function of 
its current output level and of the size of its pollution level. Their model restricts 
attention to stationary Markov tax rules that are linear in output, though not 
necessarily linear in the pollution stock. 
Long and Soubeyran (2005) demonstrate that optimal tax rates per union of 
emission are not the same for all firms. They call this property selective penalization 
and their optimal distortion theorem states that the efficient tax structure requires that 
high cost firms pay a higher tax rate. They characterize analytically the optimal tax 
structures of penalties for polluting firms with heterogeneous costs. They show that 
there is a bias in favor of efficient firms, so in achieving efficiency a structure of 
systematic biases emerges. Finally their analysis can be extended to study the role of 
strategic trade policy in a presence of a polluting international oligopoly. 
In the present model things are slightly different. Firms, represented by a 
representative one agent, they produce a disutility caused by the production process. 
Here the disutility is in the sense of the negative utility; that is, damages from 
pollution in utility terms. Moreover government pays for the flow of a public good 
using the tax revenues collected by taxing the polluting agents. Every agent 
accumulates a stock of pollution depending on the output level that is also subject to 
taxation. 
However in these leader–follower games, where government acts as the leader 
attempting to influence the other agents (consumers or producers), the followers to the 
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announced government policy, the government’s optimal program is often time 
inconsistent. Here time consistency of the tax policy is intuitive: the effect of the tax 
on the agent’s present discounted value of future utility must be independent of the 
level of the pollution.  
Specifically, it is possible to have open – loop Stackelberg equilibrium that is 
not only time consistent, but also sub-game perfect. There are at least two cases for 
which the latter is true. The first and most usual is the case where the leader’s control 
variables cannot not influence the follower’s co–state variables, so that implies the 
leader cannot manipulate the follower’s objective functional and the second but not 
usual one for which the feedback effects are not present caused that all control 
variables are independent of the state variables. 
Models that investigate the problem of time inconsistency can be found in 
existing works of Xie (1997) and in the recent Karp – Ho Lee (2003) work among 
others. Xie (1997), using a leader – follower dynamic model of output taxation with 
capital accumulation, proves that if the boundary (transversality) condition ( 0ξ = ) is 
necessary for optimality then the government tax policy is time inconsistent due to the 
tax policy equals to zero, so the zero tax rule can’t be an optimal one.  
However, imposing two other additional boundary conditions, it shows that 
the latter is spurious for optimality. Karp and Ho Lee (2003) in the same setting 
generalize Xie’s findings. Assuming, as the basic assumption, that the government tax 
policy committed to be multiplicatively separable and the primitive production and 
utility functions are given, there exists the possibility to construct a function ( )b t  
(multiplied by the tax rule ( )b t ), in order to obtain the time consistent tax ( ) ( )b t tτ . 
Our proposed model as a leader–follower one, in which the tax policy is 
endogenous function, faces the same time inconsistency problem. But our model 
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differs from Xie’s (1997) and Karp and Lee (2003) as a model of an accumulated 
pollution stock and the tax policy is imposed in order to correct externalities caused 
by pollution. So state and control variables are different, but the stress of thought is to 
find the conditions under which the outcome is time consistent. One our main findings 
is that as firms emit pollution by production, causing a disutility, it may be possible to 
have a time consistent government policy announced at the start of the game. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 comments on time 
inconsistency for the leader – follower games. Section 3 presents the proposed model. 
Section 4 investigates the boundary conditions under which the open loop tax policy 
is time consistent. Section 5 sets and solves the social planning optimal control 
problem; section 6 faces the leader – follower same game with N agents. Section 7 
provides a performance index under different regimes and section 8 also concludes. 
 
2.  Time inconsistency in Stackelberg games 
The issue of time consistency of optimal policy is central in modern economic 
theory. Since the influential work by Kydland and Prescott (1977) economists have 
attempted different approaches to resolve the inconsistency problem. One possible 
strategy is to consider the interaction between the policy maker and the agent in a 
dynamic game setup. A number of researchers like Cohen and Michel (1988) found 
that a time consistent outcome corresponds to a feedback Nash equilibrium, while the 
open loop Stackelberg equilibrium corresponds to a time inconsistent policy. 
However it is possible in some cases the open loop Stackelberg equilibrium to 
produce time consistent outcomes. 
The most often Stackelberg dynamic models are the models for which the role 
of the leader is undertaken by the government. The leader announces its optimal 
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strategy (or policy) and adheres or makes the commitment to that announced policy. 
The follower at first believes the leader’s commitment, but as time goes by the leader 
released from its commitment without the follower’s knowledge. There are a few 
reasonable ways to explain why this deviation is beneficial for the leader. However 
this modification gives raise to the issue of time inconsistency in Stackelberg games.  
In differential Stackelberg games with open loop informational structure time 
inconsistency hinges on the controllability of the follower’s co – state variable. Here 
controllability of the follower’s co – state variable is defined as whether this variable 
is independent of the leader’s control path. Dockner et al (2000) shows that if the 
follower’s co – state variable is uncontrollable by the leader, then the open – loop 
Stackelberg equilibrium is time consistent. However the time consistency is highly 
dependent on the game’s special structure. 
Things seem better in the case where the players use Markovian strategies. As 
by definition Markovian strategies are time consistent, one would expect that using 
Markovian strategies in a leader – follower game the equilibrium outcome is expected 
to be time consistent. However existing literature on Markovian strategies restricts to 
optimal capital tax and income redistribution models. Optimal capital taxation based 
on time consistent Markovian strategies has been investigated by Kemp et al (1993) in 
continuous time and by Krusell (2002) in discrete time. Given Markovian strategies 
the optimal equilibrium tax rate is generally not zero since without commitment the 
government will always have an incentive to deviate from the zero tax policy. Strulik 
(2002) extends the literature of optimal capital taxation and redistribution by 
discussion of adjustment dynamics.  
For the special case of logarithmic utility he provides a qualitative discussion 
which is supplemented by numerical computations of adjustment paths for the more 
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general case of iso–elastic utility. Lindner and Strulik (2004) investigate a Markovian 
Stackelberg strategy of taxation and redistribution in a differential game using as basis 
the referenced Alesina and Rodrik’s (1994) median voter static model. In a 
framework of constant marginal returns on capital they find that optimal tax rates 
trajectories are time independent. This implies that the Stackelberg solution is time 
consistent and there exist no adjustment dynamics either in economic growth or in the 
public sector growth. 
 
 3. The proposed model 
There is a continuum of producers in an oligopoly market. The above agents 
produce a single product which is consumed, implying there is no output stock. 
Production process emits a flow of pollution that is subject to a tax rule imposed by 
the government to every polluting oligopolist. The tax rule announced by the 
government at time zero of the game, so is easy to set ( ) [ ]{ }0,1 , 0t tτ ∈ ≥  where ( )tτ  
means the tax rule. As a usual assumption the government expenditures are in the 
form of public goods. 
In order to form the agents’ behavior with respect to environmental variables 
we adopt a neoclassical production function as in augmented Solow’s model, with  the 
flow of pollution regarded as an input along the lines of  Brock (1973) or Stokey 
(1996). Adopting these approaches, then actual output can be defined in terms of the 
flow of pollution.  
Moreover it is assumed that production process generate emissions up to a 
standard emission level (that is, emissions per unit output are constant at a given 
level), and the disutility from pollution is not taken into account from agents. We 
denote by is  the pollution stock accumulated by the i  representative agent. As the 
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pollution stock accumulates by production it is reasonable to assume that the pollution 
stock accumulation is dependent on the net value of the pollution stock and on output, 
as well.  
Here the net value of accumulated pollution stock could be meant the gross 
pollution value minus taxes imposed to the damage caused by the pollution, but minus 
the net value of the ‘clean’ output. 
In this way the differential equation that describes the pollution stock evolution is the 
following (1): 
                                    ( ) ( )1i i is t s q tτ= − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦&      
where iq  denotes i ’s agent ‘clean’ output and ( ) ( ),i ig s t t sτ=  is i ’s agent tax 
payment function due to the pollution emission caused by its production. 
In order to explain the differential equation of motion of the pollution 
accumulation we take the position that production function produces a “good” means 
the clean output and a “bad” representing pollution. For the “good” part of the 
equation, the second term of the right hand side, the abatement capital, ak ,  is used, 
while for the “bad” production is used the pollutant part of capital pk . 
The equation of pollutants evolution has no meaning in the case of zero 
production, that is when ( ) 0iq t = , and this is the standard pollution existence 
requirement. To make things clear assume for a moment that ( ) 0iq t =  and ( ) 0tt =  
this implies i is s=&  with solution ( ) ts t Ce= , where C  is the integration constant, but 
                                                 
(1) The equation of motion implicitly assumes the technology with respect to pollution that used. Taking 
for example the steady state level of pollution accumulation, this equation implies that the value of  the 
‘clean’ output equals to the net value of pollution which could be meant that no improvement (cleaner) 
onto technology used in production process. For cleaner technologies ( )0is <&  the net value of output 
exceeds the value of accumulated pollution. 
 
 8
this is impossible, except the arbitrary case for which 0C = . So it is reasonable to set 
( ) 0is t =  in the case of ( ) 0iq t =  by definition, implying 0i i
ds s
dt
= =&  with solution, 
to the above equation of pollutants evolution,  ( )is t C= , where C  is a constant. The 
latter constant could be meant the initial value of pollutants, as in a usual assumption. 
In the same way there is no meaning for the equation 
( ) ( ) ( )1i i i
ds t
s t s t
dt
tι ω= = -λ ϋ&  with 
output absent, so is again reasonable to set by definition of the pollution existence as 
above ( ) 0is t =  when ( ) 0iq t = .  
First, we claim an increase in output to means more output produced in the 
sense that the increase on output achieved only using cleaner technologies in the 
production possibilities, with these technologies set against pollution.  In this way an 
increase on output may reduce pollutants and consequently the pollution 
accumulation. This could be meant that the cleaner technologies usage is obligatory 
for each polluting firm. 
Second, we claim that the accumulation of pollutants to measured in values 
rather than in quantities. Evaluating pollutants, once an agent fulfills its pollution 
liability in tax bill (represented by the payment function ( ) ( ),i ig s t t sτ= )  it is no 
more responsible for himself to every pollution accumulation, for the simple reason in 
that the pollutants manipulation is by the government undertaken via the tax revenues 
devolved to the public good provision. So we can conclude that the payment function 
( ),ig s t  decays nothing else but the value of the accumulated pollution stock.  
Moreover the pollution accumulation is responsible for the disutility incurred 
in an economy. In this model we denote disutility produced by emission as a negative 
utility for both agents and government.   
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As we mention the tax revenues are used by the government for public goods 
provision, and the public goods produces utility as well. We assume that negative 
utility caused by production process ( )iE q and the utility caused by the public good 
provision ( )V g are both concave and strictly increasing functions. Furthermore 
( ) ( )0 0E V′ ′= = +∞ . 
After all the representative agent maximization problem is 
                                   ( )( ) ( )
0
max t ie E q t V G dt
ρ
∞
− ⎡ ⎤+⎣ ⎦∫   
subject to                      ( ) ( )1i i is t s q tτ= − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦&  
Assuming that all agents are identical, so we can remove the subscripts of the above 
and the problem reduces to 
                                     ( )( ) ( )
0
max te E q t V G dtρ
∞
− ⎡ ⎤+⎣ ⎦∫   
subject to                      ( ) ( )1s t s q tτ= − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦&                                                  ( )1  
 
4.  Open loop Equilibrium 
Forming the follower’s Hamiltonian current value 
                           ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), , , 1F FH G q t E q V G t s qµ µ τ= + + − −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦    ( )2  
then the first order conditions (F. O. C) for optimality are: 
                                    ( ) ( )0 0F FH E q tq µ
∂ ′= ⇒ − =∂            ( )3  
and                ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1FF F F FHt t t t tsµ ρµ µ ρ τ µ∂= − + ⇒ = − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∂& &     ( )4  
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 The first condition ( )3  yields ( )Fq t  as a function of ( )tµ , that is we have 
( ) ( )( )Fq t f tµ=  where we have set ( ) ( )( ) ( )1F Ff Eµ µ−′= . Applying the implicit 
function theorem we can see that ( ) ( )( )
1 0F
F
f
E f
µ µ
−′ = >′′ . It follows that if we can 
find functions ( ).Fµ  and ( ).s  that satisfy the differential equations  
                                      ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1Fs t f t t s tµ τ= −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦&             ( )5  
                                        ( ) ( )( ) ( )1F Ft t tµ ρ τ µ= − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦&                 ( )6  
and the boundary conditions ( ) 00s s=  and  
                                             ( ) ( )lim 0Ft t s tµ→∞ =                        ( )7  
then the optimal open loop strategy of the follower is given by ( ) ( )( ). Fq f tµ=  
Now let us turn into the leader’s problem. The government acting as a leader 
chooses the tax rate ( )tτ . The tax revenue is used to provide the government 
services ( ) ( ) ( )g t t s tτ= . The utility maximized consists of two parts: the disutility 
caused by the production that emits pollution and the utility caused by the government 
services. The leader’s maximization problem that appears is subject to both pollution 
accumulation constraint and to the follower’s best response (expressed by Fµ ) into 
the announced government policy constraint as well.  
Thus the government problem formulated as follows 
 
                              ( ) ( )
0
max te E q V g dtρ
∞
− +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∫  
subject to             ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 Fs t t s t f tτ µ= − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦&            
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and                       ( ) ( )( ) ( )1F Ft t tµ ρ τ µ= − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦&  
the leader’s problem treats , Fs µ  as state variables and the tax rate, τ , as a control 
variable. 
Then the leader’s Hamiltonian is formulated as  
    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1L L F L FH E q V g t s t f t t tψ τ µ ξ ρ τ µ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= + + − − + − −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
Where ,L Lψ ξ  are the co-state variables of the states , Fs µ  respectively.  
The F. O. C. for optimality are: 
               ( ) 0L
H
tτ
∂ =∂  
                          ( ) ( )( )1LL L LHt sψ ρψ ψ τ ρ∂= − + = − +∂&  
                          ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1LL L L F L L
F
Ht f tξ ρξ ψ µ ξ ρ τ ρξµ
∂ ′= − + = − − − − +∂
&  
From the latter formulation the time inconsistency can be seen as follows. Suppose we 
have solved the problem for the leader, then the function ( ).Lψ  determines the time 
path of the leader’s announced tax rate at time zero of the game. Let the game proceed 
and the leader adheres to its announcement. Then at some time instant 1 0t >  the state 
and co–state variables have some values ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * *1 1 1 1, , ,F L Ls t t t tµ ψ ξ  with ( )* 1 0L tξ ≠ . 
Suppose that at time instant 1t  the leader deviates from the announced time path. At 
the new time starting point the leader imposes the new tax rule ( ) ( )*1 1t tτ τ= , which 
it must take as given. However, it does not have to take the ( ) ( )*1 1F Ft tµ µ=  as a given 
initial condition, but chooses a new initial condition ( ) ( )*1 1F Ft tµ µ≠ . Therefore the 
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optimal value of the associated co – state variable is 0Lξ = , but this implies that the 
new solution is not a continuation of the original’s problem solution.  
Let us now consider the case where both the emissions disutility and utility 
functions ( ).E  and ( ).V  respectively are given in logarithmic form and this 
specification avoids the time inconsistency problem. 
 
Proposition 1. 
The Stackelberg pollution game described above yields time consistent strategies 
provided both the emission and utility functions are given in logarithmic form. 
Proof 
The Hamiltonian current value is 
                     ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )ln ln 1F FH q t G t t s t q tµ τ⎡ ⎤= + + − −⎣ ⎦  
The F. O. C ( )3  now yields 
                                                ( ) ( )
1
F
q t
tµ=               ( )8  
Equation ( )8  predicts that the follower’s co – state variable ( )F tµ  is independent of 
the leader’s control variable ( )tτ  and therefore the follower’s co – state variable is 
uncontrollable by the leader’s control path. This proves that the strategy is a time 
consistent one. 
Substituting condition ( )8  into ( )1  we have 
                                            ( ) ( ) ( )
11
F
s t s t
t
τ µ= − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦&        ( )9  
Multiplying both sides of ( )9  by ( )F tµ  the last gives 
                                 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1F Fs t t t t s tµ τ µ= − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦&                 ( )10  
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Again multiplying both sides of the F. O. condition ( )4  by ( )s t  the latter gives the 
result  
                              ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1F Ft s t t s t tµ ρ τ µ= − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦&               ( )11  
Summing up ( )10  and ( )11  we have the differential equation 
                              
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 1F Fd s t t s t tdt
µ ρ µ= −                    ( )12  
The solution of ( )12  is now     ( ) ( ) 11 tFs t t eρµ ρ= +Ω                          ( )13  
where 1Ω  is the integration constant. In order to satisfy the tranversality condition 
( )7  is necessary to set 1 0Ω = . 
The solution ( )13  turns to  
                                                 ( ) ( ) 1Fs t tµ ρ=                           ( )14  
Combining equations ( )8  and ( )14  
                                                     ( ) ( )q t s tρ=                         ( )15  
Substituting ( )15  into ( )1   
                                                   ( ) ( ) ( )1s t s t s tτ ρ= − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦&                ( )16  
from which we get the solutions 
                             ( ) ( )0 10
t
s ds
s t s e
τ ρ− −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∫= and      ( ) ( )0 10
t
s ds
q t s e
τ ρ
ρ
− −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∫=  
Now we can take the leader’s position in order to build her Hamiltonian. The 
policy maker chooses the tax rule ( )tτ , so as to maximize the discounted disutility 
produced by production emissions and to maximize the discounted utility caused by 
the public good provision, under the constraints represented as: 
 14
                                           ( ) ( )1s t s q tτ= − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦&  
                                        ( ) ( )( ) ( )1F Ft t tµ ρ τ µ= − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦&  
and under the follower’s optimal production decision given as 
                                           ( ) ( )
1
F
q t
tµ=   
In this way the leader’s Hamiltonian current value for the problem becomes 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1ln ln 1 1L L L F
F F
H t s t t s t tτ ψ τ ξ ρ τ µµ µ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= + + − − + − −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
Where ,L Lψ ξ  denote the co–state variables of the states , Fs µ  respectively. The  
F.O.C’s for the leader are  
                               ( )L
H
tτ
∂ =∂ ( ) ( ) ( )
1 0L L Fs t tt
ψ ξ µτ − + =                        ( )17  
                                       ( ) ( ) ( )L L L
H t t
s t
ψ ρψ∂− = −∂ &                                  ( )18  
                                  ( ) ( ) ( )L L LF
H t t
t
ξ ρξµ
∂− = −∂
&                                   ( )19  
It is worth noting that because the feedback effects absence of either ( )18  and ( )19    
the government’s F. O. Cs are defined for an open loop solution. 
Solving equation ( )17  with respect to the tax rate gives 
                                        ( ) ( ) ( )
1
L L F
t
s t t
τ ψ ξ µ= −                                                  ( )20  
In the same manner ( )18  and ( )19  yields respectively 
                   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1LL L L
Ht t t t
s t s t
ψ ρψ ψ ρ τ∂ ⎡ ⎤= − + = − + − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦∂&                 ( )21  
and  ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2
2
1F L F LL
L L
F F
t t t t tHt t
t t
µ τ ξ µ ψξ ρξµ µ
− + −⎡ ⎤∂ ⎣ ⎦= − + =∂
&               ( )22  
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Substitute into the state dynamics the ( ) ( )
1
F t s t
µ ρ= ,  we obtain 
                                   ( ) ( )1s t s s tτ ρ= − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦&                                              ( )23  
Multiplying both sides by ( )L tψ  the latter yields 
                            ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1L L Ls t t t t s t t s tψ ψ τ ψ ρ= − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦&              ( )24  
Again multiplying both terms of ( )21  by ( )s t  yields 
                                ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1L Lt s t s t t tψ ψ ρ τ⎡ ⎤= − − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦&                  ( )25  
Summing up ( )24  and ( )25  we have 
                                      
( ) ( )
1L
d t s t
dt
ψ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ = −                                ( )26  
The differential equation ( )26  has the solution  
                                                ( ) ( ) 2L t s t tψ = Ω −                          ( )27  
With 2Ω  to denotes the integration constant. Combine ( )27  with ( )14  we have 
                                  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2L F
tt t t
s t
ψ µ ρΩ −= = Ω −               ( )28  
Relation ( )22  now after substitution ( )28  and multiplication by ( )F tµ   gives  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2
2
1F L F LL
L L
F F
t t t t tHt t
t t
µ τ ξ µ ψξ ρξµ µ
− + −⎡ ⎤∂ ⎣ ⎦= − + =∂
&  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
2
1
1 1 29
F L F F
L F
F
L F F L
t t t t t t
t t
t
t t t t t t
µ ξ τ µ ρ µξ µ µ
ξ µ µ ξ τ ρ
− + Ω − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦= ⇒
= − − Ω − +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
&
&
                                 
Now multiplying both sides of ( )4  by ( )L tξ  
                                    ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1F L F Lt t t t tµ ξ ρ τ µ ξ= − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦&                ( )30  
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The sum of ( )29  and ( )30  yields the differential equation 
                         
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 1F L F Ld t t t t tdt
µ ξ ρµ ξ ρ= − Ω − +                   ( )31  
with the following solution  
                                       ( ) ( ) 3 2 2tF Lt t e tρµ ξ ρ= Ω +Ω − −                          ( )32  
where 2 3,Ω Ω  are integration constants. 
Condition ( )20  with the aid of  ( ) ( )27 , 32  can be expressed as 
           ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 3
2 2 3
1 1
2 2 ttL L F
t
s t t t t et t e
ρρ
ρτ ψ ξ µ ρ
ρ
= = =− −ΩΩ − −Ω + −Ω +
 
As the tax rule is always a positive number, it is reasonable to set 3 0Ω = , so the latter 
simplifies to                                         
2
ρτ =                                    
We find that the tax rule ( )tτ is independent of the pollution stock ( )s t . This fact 
combined with the result ( )8  gives raise that the game is not only time consistent but 
also sub-game perfect. 
Substituting the tax rate into the time paths of pollution and output 
respectively we have:      
                 ( ) ( ) ( )0 0
3 31 1 12 2
0 0 0
t t
s ds ds t
s t s e s t s e s e
ρ ρτ ρ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− − −⎡ ⎤ ⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∫ ∫= ⇒ = =                  ( )33  
               ( ) ( ) ( )0 0
3 31 1 12 2
0 0 0
t t
s ds ds t
q t s e q t s e s e
ρ ρτ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∫ ∫= ⇒ = =           ( )34  
Both ( )33  and ( )34  are monotonically increase over the time provided 2
3
ρ < , that is 
for small discount rates. 
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The government services provision ( ) ( ) ( )g t t s tτ=  according to the tax rule 
and ( )33  expressed as follows: 
                     ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
3 31 12 2
0 02 2 2
t
ds t
g t t s t s t s e s e
ρ ρρ ρ ρτ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∫= = = =            ( )35  
for which the increase requirement is the same as above that is for small discount 
rates 2
3
ρ < . 
 
5. The social planning optimal control problem. 
In this section we suppose that the benevolent social planner chooses both output and 
the tax rate, using the information of the public good provision ( ) ( ) ( )g t s t tτ= . 
Then the problem consists of: 
                           ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ),
0
max ln lnt
q t t
e q t s t t dtρτ τ
∞
− ⎡ ⎤+⎣ ⎦∫                      ( )36  
                             ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ). 1s t s t t s t q tτ= − −&                         ( )37     
The Hamiltonian current value formulated as follows: 
           ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )ln ln 1spH q t s t t t t s t q tτ λ τ⎡ ⎤= + + − −⎣ ⎦  ( )38  
The F.O.C.s are: 
                                   ( ) ( ) ( )
10sp
H
t
q t q t
λ∂ = ⇒ =∂                    ( )39  
                                ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
10sp
H
t
t t s t
ττ λ
∂ = ⇒ =∂                  ( )40  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
11sp
H
t t t t t
s t s t
ρλ λ λ λ ρ τ∂ ⎡ ⎤− + = ⇒ = − − −⎣ ⎦∂
& &        ( )41  
and the transversality condition  
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                                       ( ) ( )lim 0t
t
e t s tρ λ−→∞ =                        ( )42  
Plugging ( )39  into the constraint ( )37  and multiplying both sides by ( )tλ we have  
                          ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1s t t t t s tλ λ τ= − −&                 ( )43  
Multiplying ( )41  by ( )s t  results to: 
                     ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1s t t s t t tλ λ ρ τ⎡ ⎤= − − −⎣ ⎦&                  ( )44  
Summing up ( ) ( )43 , 44  the result is 
                           
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 2d t s t s t t
dt
λ ρ λ= −               ( )45  
with solution ( ) ( ) 2 tt s t Ceρλ ρ= + .  
In order to satisfied the transversality condition ( )42  we set the integration 
constant C  equal to zero, so the solution turns to ( ) ( )
2t
s t
λ ρ=    from which making 
use of  ( )39  and  ( )40 , we end-up to  
                                                    ( ) ( )
2
s t
q t
ρ=                                  ( )46  
                                                          ( )
2
t ρτ =                                  ( )47  
and these result to the next proposition. 
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Proposition 2. 
The Stackelberg game of pollution with logarithmic utility and disutility functions 
yields the same tax rate as in the benchmark case of social planning, but different 
levels of output. 
We now are able to compute all trajectories of the relevant variables for the 
social planer problem. Substituting the tax rate into the constraint  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1
2 2
s t
s t t s t q t s t s t s t
ρρτ ρ⎛ ⎞= − − = − − ⇒ = −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠& &   
with solution                                                     ( ) ( )10 ts t s e ρ−=             ( )48  
and with substitution into ( )46  we take 
                                                       ( ) ( )102 tq t s e ρ
ρ −=         ( )49  
And the trajectory of the public good provision is                                    
                           ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )102 2 tg t t s t s t s e ρ
ρ ρτ −= = =       ( )50  
Notice that all trajectories are increasing functions provided 1ρ < , that is for small 
discount rates. 
 
6.  The game with N identical private firms as followers 
 Suppose now that N identical private firms choose the level of its output with 
the technology improvement such that described in section 2, that is the more the 
output the less the pollution will be, due to the cleaner technologies usage. Moreover 
the firms’ share of ( )i tt  used by the government in order to provide the public good 
which is non – rival and non excludable. In this way the amount of public good at 
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time t  will be ( ) ( ) ( )
1
n
i i
i
G t t s tτ
=
=∑ . So each private firm solves the following 
problem with respect to the control variables ( )iq t  and ( )i tt . 
                                 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),
0
max ln ln
i i
t
iq t t
e q t G t dtρτ
∞
− +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∫                     ( )51  
subject to                   ( ) ( ) ( )
1
N
m m
m
G t t s tτ
=
=∑  
                                   ( )( ) ( )1m m m ms t s q tτ= − −&         ( )1,...,m N=  
                                   ( )
0
0 0m ms s= >  
Forming the Hamiltonian current value we have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1,
1,
ln ln
1 1
N
i i i i j j
j j i
N
ii i i i ij i i i
j j i
H q t s t t s t
t s t q t t s t q t
t t
l t l t
= Ή
= Ή
ι ω
κ ϊ= + + +κ ϊ
λ ϋ
ι ω ι ω- - + - -κ ϊ κ ϊλ ϋ λ ϋ
ε
ε
                  ( )52  
and the FOCs: 
                 
( ) ( )
( )1 0i ii
i i
H t
q t q t
l¶ = - =
¶
                                   ( )53  
           
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1,
0ii ii iN
i
i i j j
j j i
s tH t s t
t s t t s t t
l
t t t
= Ή
¶ = - =
¶ + ε
             ( )54  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1,
1 ii ii ii ii ii i N
i
i i j j
j j i
tH t t t t t
s s t t s t t
t
l r l l l r t
t t
= Ή
¶ ι ω- = - ή = - - -κ ϊλ ϋ¶ + ε
& &
( )55  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1,
1 ji ij ij ij ij j N
j
i i j j
j j i
tH t t t t t
s s t t s t t
t
l r l l l r t
t t
= Ή
¶ ι ω- = - ή = - - -κ ϊλ ϋ¶ + ε
& &
( )56  
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and the transversality condition: ( ) ( )lim 0t ii it e t s t
r l-
® ¥
=  
For the symmetry assumptions let us to write: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),i j i js t s t s t t t tt t t= = = = , therefore the co–state becomes now 
( ) ( ) ( )ii jjt t tl l l= =  and the FOCs   
( )53  becomes:             ( )
( )
1q t
tl
=                                ( )57           
( )54  becomes:          ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
571t q t Ns t t
N t s t
t t
l
= ή =           ( )58  
( )55  and ( )56  collapses to ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1t Ns t t t t Ns t t tl t l r t t tι ωι ω= - - -κ ϊλ ϋλ ϋ&  and 
multiplying both sides by ( )s t  finally 
                         ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 11s t t s t t t
N
l l r tι ω= - - -κ ϊλ ϋ
&         ( )59  
Substituting the ( )57  inside the system dynamics yields 
                              ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1t s t s t t tl l tι ω= - -λ ϋ&               ( )60  
The sum of ( )59  and ( )60  is:  ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 1d s t t Ns t t
dt N
l
r l += - ,  with solution  
                                            ( ) ( ) 1 tNs t t e
N
rl
r
+= + W            ( )61  
with W to denote the integration constant, which must be set to zero in order to 
satisfied the transversality condition and the solution now turns to  
                                        ( ) ( ) 1 Ns t t
N
l
r
+=        ( )62  
and after substitution ( )57  into ( )62  the final output defined as 
                                   ( ) ( )
1
Nq t s t
N
r=
+
         ( )63  
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Substituting ( )62  into equation ( )58  ( )
( ) ( )
1t
N t s t
t
l
=  the last yields 
                      ( )
( ) ( )
1
1
t
N t s t N
rt
l
= =
+
         ( )64  
Substitution of ( )63  and ( )64  into the pollutants equation of motion 
( )( ) ( ) ( )1s t s t q tτ= − −& the latter yields finally: 
                                        ( ) ( ) ( )1s t s tr= -&                    ( )65  
with solution                     ( ) ( )10 ts t s e r-=                          ( )66  
and   ( )63  finally takes the form:  ( ) ( )101
tNq t s e
N
rr -=
+
       ( )67  
From solutions about output and pollution we can see that these equations are 
increasing functions over the time provided 1r > . 
 
7.  A Welfare performance index 
Having a measure of the welfare expressed by 
                                ( ) ( )
0
ln lntV e q t G t dtρ
∞
−= +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∫          ( )68  
we can compare the two different regimes of the pollution game. 
In the Stackelberg game the measure of welfare is 
                       
2 3 2 3
2 2
0 0
0
ln ln
2
t tt
S
NV e s e s e dt
ρ ρ
ρ ρρ
∞ − −
− ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∫  
                  ( ) ( )( )
0
0
2
0
ln ln 2 3 12t
S
Ns
s t
V e ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
∞
−
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥− += − − −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
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( )0
2
1ln 2ln ln 2 32
S
s N
V
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
+ + −= +           ( )69  
Under the social planning regime  
                     ( ) ( )1 10 0
0
ln ln
2 2
t tt
SP
s NV e e s e dtρ ρρ ρ ρ
∞
− −− ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∫  
                  ( ) ( )( )
0
0
2
0
ln ln 2 1 12t
SP
Ns
s t
V e ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
∞
−
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥− += − − −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 
                            
( ) ( )0
2
1ln ln 2ln 2 14
SP
N s
V
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
+ + −= +      ( )70  
Comparing ( )69  and ( )70  we have 
( ) ( ) ( )0 0
2 2
1 1ln ln 2ln ln 2ln ln2 1 2 34 2
1 ln 2 0
SP S
N s s N
V V
ρ ρρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ
+ + + +− −− = + − − =
−= >
 
 
Proposition 3. 
The Stackelberg game described above, with the government acting as leader, results 
in an inefficient outcome, comparing to the social planning outcome. 
 
 24
8. Conclusion 
It is well known that pollution occurrence is synonymous with the production 
existence. Consequently pollution externality in production process can be though as 
the value of the part of output for which the “polluted” part of input capital used, if we 
assume that it is possible to apart the input capital in the abatement capital and the 
polluted part of it. The latter could be done in the case of a separable production 
function for example. So it is easy to distinguish the values of the “net” output from 
the value of the “polluted” output. This paper takes the position that the value of 
accumulated pollution is rather a fact of differences, in values, of the two above parts 
of  output. Precisely if the value of the polluted part, at any instant of time, is greater 
than the abatement part, and this is a prediction what technologies used in the 
production process, then it is clear that pollution accumulated.  
Conversely if the value of the abatement part of output is greater than the 
polluted part, the pollutants at this instant of time are a negative value, consequently 
this value reduces the accumulation. But what meaning can be assigned in the value 
of pollution? In a leader – follower game for which the role of the leader is 
undertaken by the government, in the role of  the follower are N polluting firms with 
pollution caused by production, and the government announces a tax rule in order to 
devolve the tax revenues in the public good of antipollution.  
We claim in that game once a representative firm fulfils the imposed tax 
payment liability in money, the above firm is no more responsible for every pollution 
accumulation in value. It is certain that in this setting the tax payment function 
represented by the tax revenues collected by the government decays the value of the 
pollution accumulation. The reasoning of the last adoption is because the load of 
antipollution is undertaken by the government, as the usual assumption. So the tax 
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rate payment choice is policy discretion by the government undertaken, as well. Here 
the well known time inconsistency problem arises in the sense that the government is 
in the place to revise the announced tax policy.  
Technically speaking the time inconsistency depends upon the controllability 
by the leader, on the follower’s co – state variable, where controllability of the 
follower’s co – state variable means whether this variable is independent of the 
leader’s control path, in an open loop informational structure of the game. The reason 
of the open loop choice is that the other type of informational structure, the closed 
loop or Markovian, is subject to few objectives, one of these is the fact that the leader 
– follower game solution collapses to one for which the Markovian strategies used by 
the leader, while open loop strategies used by the follower, as in the Dockner et al. 
(2000) argument.  
In these lines, the present paper develops a model of pollution such that for the 
value of accumulated pollution stock a part of capital, the abatement, is used. In this 
setting we found, using a well known logarithmic utility functions, the time consistent 
tax rate and the time paths of the output and pollution of the representative polluted 
agent, as an expression of the pollution variable. Both the time paths are increasing 
time functions, for small discount rates. In the social planer optimal control problem 
the outcomes are in the same time consistent line, with the same tax rate but different 
level of outputs. Next solving the game with N private agents we found that output is 
dependent on the value of follower agents N and on the value of pollution as well, as 
expression ( )67  reveals. Finally constructing a simple index of performance, in order 
to compare the various outcomes of the proposed model, we conclude in that the 
social planning outcome is, as we expect, superior to the Stackelberg game for 
strategic agents play.  
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